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The criminal defense lawyer occupies a special doctrinal place 
in criminal procedure. It is the primary structural guarantor of 
fairness, the single most important source of validation for 
individual convictions. Conversely, if a person did have a 
competent lawyer, it generates a set of presumptions that his trial 
was in fact fair, the evidence sufficient, and his plea knowing and 
voluntary. This is a highly problematic legal fiction. The presence 
of counsel advances but cannot guarantee fair trials and 
voluntary pleas. More fundamentally, a lawyer in an individual 
case will often be powerless to address a wide variety of systemic 
injustices. A defendant may be the victim of overbroad laws, racial 
selectivity in policing, prosecutorial overcharging, judicial 
hostility to defendants, or harsh mandatory punishments and 
collateral consequences, none of which his lawyer can 
meaningfully do anything about. In response to these limitations, 
criminal scholarship offers a variety of skeptical counter-
narratives about the ability of defense counsel to police the 
accuracy and fairness of their clients’ guilty pleas and sentences. 
Such skepticism is particularly appropriate in the misdemeanor 
context, in which millions of cases are created and rushed through 
an assembly-line process without much evidence or scrutiny. In 
this world, the presence or absence of counsel is just one piece of a 
much larger puzzle of systemic dysfunction. Accordingly, while the 
right to counsel remains an important ingredient in fair trials and 
legitimate convictions, it cannot bear the curative weight it has 
been assigned in the modern era of overcriminalization and mass 
judicial processing. Other legal actors and institutions should 
share more responsibility for protecting defendants, a 
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responsibility that now rests almost entirely and unrealistically on 
the shoulders of defense counsel. 
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I. Introduction 
“One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: ‘Let them have 
the most illustrious counsel, now. They can’t escape the noose. 
There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial.’”1 
Ever since Gideon v. Wainwright2 proclaimed that “any 
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot 
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him,”3 the 
Supreme Court has quietly established the inverse proposition: if 
a person had competent counsel, his conviction was probably 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Escobedo v. State of Ill., 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964) (quoting Ex parte 
Sullivan, D.C., 107 F. Supp. 514, 517–18 (D. Utah 1952)). 
 2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 373 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 3. Id. at 344. 
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fair.4 As the right that ensures that “all other rights of the accused 
are protected,”5 the right to counsel has become a central lens 
through which to evaluate the criminal process, and it is often seen 
not only as a necessary but increasingly sufficient guarantor of core 
defendant entitlements. The Supreme Court treats counsel as a cure 
for coercion and inaccuracy; a competently counseled plea is all but 
unassailable.6 A convicted defendant who had a lawyer by his side 
will have a tough time overturning his conviction unless he can 
show counsel to have been ineffective.7 In various ways, having a 
competent lawyer has become a kind of proxy for the conclusion that 
a defendant was treated fairly by the criminal system. 
This conflation of counsel with fair treatment is highly 
problematic. A person can be convicted in myriad unfair ways 
unrelated to the presence or absence of counsel. Defendants may 
have been selected in racially tainted processes, or overcharged 
by overzealous prosecutors under overbroad laws.8 Innocent 
defendants may plead guilty because they cannot afford bail 
pending trial and will lose jobs, homes, or children by remaining 
incarcerated, or they may plead because the trial penalty is too 
great relative to the plea offer.9 If they do not plead, defendants 
                                                                                                     
 4. See infra notes 32–49 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court 
case law tending to establish that where counsel was competent, proceedings 
were fair). 
 5. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988). 
 6. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975) (discussing the Court’s “optimistic 
view of the defense attorney’s role” in plea bargaining). 
 7. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772 (1970) (“[A] plea of guilty 
in a state court is not subject to collateral attack in a federal court on the ground 
that it was motivated by a coerced confession unless the defendant was 
incompetently advised by his attorney.”). For a discussion of how withdrawing a 
plea works outside the context of ineffectiveness, see Kirke D. Weaver, A 
Change of Heart or A Change of Law? Withdrawing A Guilty Plea Under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e), 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 273, 273 (2002) 
(“[C]ourts are unquestionably reluctant to permit defendants to withdraw from 
their plea agreements once approved by the court.”). 
 8. See Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2119, 2119 (2010) (discussing “stories of prosecutors who knowingly engage in 
unethical behavior—who overcharge questionable cases to pressure defendants 
to enter guilty pleas, make prejudicial and misleading statements to both judges 
and juries, and, most routinely of all, withhold exculpatory evidence that might 
undermine their impressive conviction rates”). 
 9. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral 
Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA 
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may be convicted by jurors hostile to their appearance, race, or 
prior criminal record.10 Once convicted, they may be sentenced 
in ways that bear little relation to their personal culpability 
under mandatory minimum sentencing laws or overly harsh 
guidelines, or by judges who exercise their discretion subtly 
affected by racial or other biases.11 In other words, the 
treatment, conviction and punishment of individuals may be 
unfair in ways that their attorney, no matter how skilled, 
cannot meaningfully address.12 
Such limitations on the role of counsel are at their height in 
the misdemeanor context. The petty offense system generates 
cases and convictions by the millions in a speedy, low-scrutiny 
process in which outcomes are largely predetermined.13 Some of 
                                                                                                     
L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2009) (“[C]ollateral consequences often overshadow the 
direct penal sentences in criminal cases. In addition to deportation, courts 
categorize many other severe consequences as collateral, including involuntary 
civil commitment, sex-offender registration, and loss of the right to vote, to 
obtain professional licenses, and to receive public housing and benefits.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Douglas O. Linder, Bending Toward Justice: John Doar and 
the “Mississippi Burning” Trial, 72 MISS. L.J. 731, 769–74 (2002) (discussing the 
impact of racism in Civil Rights-era trials). 
 11. See Anthony Nagorski, Arguments Against the Use of Recidivist 
Statutes That Contain Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 214, 214 (2010) (“The punishment a defendant serves under a 
recidivist statute may be disproportionate to the actual offense committed.”). 
 12. What constitutes “fair” or “unfair” takes numerous forms and is hardly 
a settled matter. For one version, see Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with 
Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 215–16 (2003) (arguing that the Court 
abandoned a fertile line of “public-regarding” fairness analysis when it turned 
from due process to incorporation); see also Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: 
Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model, 36 LAW & SOC. INQ. 237, 
246–48 (2011) (identifying a strain of fairness discourse within the due process 
model concerned with outcomes and equality); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the 
Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. 
L. REV. 1117, 1139–41 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
Bargaining Market] (arguing that the Court’s new plea bargaining 
jurisprudence represents a new “broader understanding of injustice” that 
includes informational and punishment inequities). 
 13. This Article is one of a series of articles exploring the significance of the 
misdemeanor process for the United States criminal system as a whole. See 
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1314–18 (2012) 
(describing lack of due process, inaccuracies, and racial dynamics of the petty 
offense process); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Aggregation] 
(exploring how the misdemeanor process generates convictions in the aggregate 
in violation of core criminal justice norms). 
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the dysfunctions of the misdemeanor process are themselves 
counsel-related, flowing from staggering caseloads and lack of 
time that defense counsel have to consult with clients, 
investigate, or litigate cases.14 But many other flaws are 
structural and insensitive to counsel’s performance. Police arrest 
large numbers of young African American men for disorder 
crimes as a way of managing urban spaces.15 Prosecutors often 
convert urban arrests into formal charges with little or no 
scrutiny, thereby ensuring that urban populations will face the 
criminal adjudicatory process one way or another.16 Because poor 
defendants often cannot make bail, they may have to sacrifice 
work or child care in order to contest their cases, and therefore 
plead guilty in large numbers.17 Punishments for petty offenses 
are also standardized, expected, and accepted by prosecutors and 
courts alike so that defendants face strong barriers to 
individualized consideration.18 Most of these factors are beyond 
the control of defense counsel, and even lawyers with time and 
resources to contest such cases can do little to alleviate the 
hydraulic pressures on defendants—even innocent ones—to 
plead. 
The classic model of counsel as the guarantor of defendant 
rights and dignity turns out to be a partial picture. There are 
                                                                                                     
 14. See ERICA J. HASHIMOTO, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POLICY, 
ASSESSING THE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM 10 (Sept. 2010), http://www. 
acslaw.org/files/Hashimoto%20Indigent%20Defense.pdf (discussing the case 
load limitations faced by public defenders). 
 15. See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: 
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 475–76 
(2000) (describing the law enforcement tactic of enforcing low-level crimes in 
urban areas, leading to a substantial increase in misdemeanor arrests). 
 16. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1709–10 (2010) (describing 
low prosecutorial declination rates). 
 17. See Candace McCoy, Caleb Was Right: Pretrial Decisions Determine 
Mostly Everything, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 135, 138 (2007) 
[I]f a poor person could not afford bail and remained in jail pretrial, 
plea bargaining and trial processes would be designed so as to affect 
his decision making at that pretrial detention point . . . . [A] great 
number of people held pretrial for minor offenses—and maybe serious 
offenses—would be willing to plead guilty just to get out of jail. 
 18. For a detailed description of these phenomena, see Natapoff, 
Aggregation, supra note 13 (discussing the standardized treatment of 
defendants).  
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some things that defense lawyers are well-situated to handle, and 
they mostly have to do with litigating evidence and law—in other 
words, the adversarial process. If the evidence is weak, counsel 
have litigation weapons to attack the government’s case.19 If 
police violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment during an 
investigation, counsel have constitutional tools to eliminate the 
evidence obtained.20 Good defense counsel are well-situated to 
uncover government errors with respect to law, evidentiary 
admissibility, guidelines calculations, and the like.21 Even in 
petty cases in which there may not be much evidence in the first 
place, defense counsel can theoretically challenge police accounts 
or produce witnesses of their own. But these opportunities are by 
their nature limited. When unfairness flows not from lack of 
evidence or a government mistake, but from institutional features 
of the criminal process, defense lawyers have fewer tools to 
protect their clients. When the process has become more 
bureaucratic and less adversarial, as it has in the petty offense 
context, classic adversarial defense weaponry matters less. 
To put it another way, when case outcomes actually depend 
on the law and the evidence, defense counsel can be very 
powerful. But at the bottom of the penal pyramid where offenses 
are petty, caseloads immense, and litigation rare, law and 
evidence exert weak influences.22 Instead, prosecutorial 
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) (providing some of those weapons, 
including motions “alleging a defect in instituting the prosecution” and “alleging 
a defect in the indictment or information . . .”). 
 20. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”); Id. amend. V (guaranteeing grand jury indictment, due process, no 
double jeopardy, and the right against self-incrimination); Georgetown Law 
Journal Association, Fifth Amendment at Trial, 91 GEO. L.J. 567, 567–68 (2003) 
(providing a summary of the Fifth Amendment’s impact on a criminal trial); 
John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the 
Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1108–10 (1989) (discussing the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections). 
 21. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012) (“Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 22. For a conceptualization of the criminal process as a penal pyramid in 
which legality wanes towards the bottom, see Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal 
Pyramid: Linking Criminal Theory and Social Practice (2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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discretion and institutional habits dominate cases, and defense 
lawyers are at a structural disadvantage. William Stuntz made 
this point indirectly when he noted that as law recedes, 
prosecutors have more power over case outcomes than defense 
counsel. 
[W]here law does not reign, the district attorney’s office 
generally does. This is one point on which I differ with . . . [the 
view that] defense attorneys “are the linchpins of the plea-
bargaining system”: improve the quality of the advice 
defendants get from their lawyers, and bargains will improve 
too. There is some merit to that position. But given the array 
of weapons the law provides, prosecutors are often in a 
position to dictate outcomes, and almost always have much 
more to say about those outcomes than do defense attorneys.23 
In effect, the weaker the shadow of trial, the weaker the role of 
defense counsel. 
Despite such limitations, the defense institution has come to 
bear the lion’s share of responsibility for maintaining systemic 
fairness. Because institutional flaws are rarely actionable, we ask 
instead about the defense lawyer: was she good, was she zealous, 
did she have enough time to litigate the case?24 If so, the law 
often concludes that the defendant got a fair trial and that the 
conviction was sound.25 The Court’s fixation on the right to 
counsel, and the weakness of other meaningful remedies for 
unfairness, have turned defense counsel into the cod liver oil of 
the criminal process, prescribed for a wide range of ailments even 
when it may be merely palliative. 
Of course the right to counsel is not the system’s sole 
regulator: criminal procedure is replete with doctrinal remedies 
that regulate numerous features of the criminal process. Fourth 
Amendment law, selective prosecution doctrine, double jeopardy, 
and a host of other rules exist to guard against numerous forms 
of unfairness.26 But unlike the right to counsel, such rules tend to 
                                                                                                     
 23. William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing 
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2549, 2558 (2004). 
 24. See infra Parts II.A–C (discussing the evaluation of defense counsel as 
a proxy for solving structural issues). 
 25. See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text (discussing the 
presumption attached when a defendant is competently counseled). 
 26. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No . . . person [shall] be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); United States v. 
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be entitlement-specific. With the possible exception of Brady 
disclosure rules,27 they do not ensure the operation of other rights 
or features of the adversarial process, only the ones to which they 
are specifically addressed. By contrast, the right to counsel 
stands alone as a system-wide remedy for multiple forms of 
unfairness and error, playing a universally validating role as the 
right that protects “all other rights.”28 As the Supreme Court put 
it, “[t]he Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance 
of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is 
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just 
results.”29 
Even as this Article traces the limits to this counsel-centric 
model, it recognizes defense counsel as the preeminent existing 
safeguard for defendant rights and accurate outcomes. Indeed, 
some of counsel’s most important contributions to systemic 
legitimacy are not tied to the enforcement of legal rules at all. 
The adversarial process is a messy place in which sometimes a 
tenacious lawyer can change results simply by refusing to give 
up. In cases in which the legal outcome may be a foregone 
conclusion, there remains deep value to the defense lawyer who 
affirms the humanity and dignity of the defendant by listening to, 
advocating for, and respecting him.30 This Article suggests only 
that above and beyond those functions, there are structural flaws 
in the criminal system—the misdemeanor process in particular—
that zealous advocacy cannot cure, and that the Gideon model 
should be complemented by other ways of policing systemic 
fairness. 
This Article begins by exploring the ways in which the 
Supreme Court has made counsel a proxy for various fairness 
inquiries and thereby sidelined scrutiny of other aspects of the 
                                                                                                     
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (establishing that selective prosecution is 
prosecutorial misconduct); supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the 
impact of the Fourth Amendment at trial). 
 27. See infra Part V.B (discussing the Brady disclosure rules). 
 28. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988). 
 29. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
 30. See Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life 
and Fractured Ego of the Empathetic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1203, 1208–11 (2004) (“Defenders uphold the political philosophy 
underlying the American system of justice and safeguard the dignity of each 
member of society no matter how low he or she has fallen.”). 
GIDEON SKEPTICISM 1057 
criminal process that burden or disadvantage defendants. It then 
surveys the growth of what I call “Gideon skepticism”: the 
recognition that defense counsel cannot perform the legitimating 
role it has been assigned in areas such as plea bargaining and 
guideline sentencing.31 It argues that Gideon skepticism should 
be at its height with respect to the misdemeanor process, in 
which counsel is least able to counteract large-scale institutional 
tendencies towards inaccuracy, procedural laxity, and racial 
selection bias. It concludes by thinking about alternative 
mechanisms to ensure the fair functioning of the criminal 
process, including greater roles for public defender offices, 
prosecutors, and especially in the misdemeanor context, 
defendant education. 
II. The Right to Counsel as the Dominant Proxy for Fairness 
In a variety of ways, the Court has made counsel the sine qua 
non of legitimacy, the touchstone for figuring out whether the 
system is working the way it should. Mostly this is substantive: 
having competent counsel establishes a strong presumption that 
the trial was fair or that the plea was intelligent.32 Sometimes it 
is a matter of procedure. For example, an ineffective counsel 
claim has become a prerequisite for habeas review when 
defendants failed to raise claims below, meaning that 
procedurally defaulted claims must almost always be 
accompanied by an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel 
(IAC).33 This Part explores some of the specific doctrinal 
                                                                                                     
 31. See infra Part II.C (noting the use of defense counsel to ensure fairness 
in plea bargaining). 
 32. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (noting that the two-part 
Strickland test applies to pleas and “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ 
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial”); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: 
The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland 
Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 474–75 (1996) (discussing the 
presumptions established by case law that assume a trial is fair and an attorney 
competent). 
 33. See Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the 
Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65, 112 (1993) (noting that “a procedurally 
defaulted claim—that is, a claim not timely raised in state court—cannot be 
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dynamics by which the Court has turned the right to counsel into 
a proxy for other fairness values. 
A. As a Cure for Coercion 
Since the vast majority of convictions are the result of plea 
bargains, counsel’s role in validating those bargains is perhaps its 
single largest contribution to systemic legitimacy. Ever since the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of plea bargaining, it has 
relied on counsel to dissipate the coercive pressure of that 
process.34 In Brady v. United States,35 the Court held that a 
defendant who pled guilty in order to avoid the death penalty was 
not coerced, largely because he was advised by “competent 
counsel.”36 The Court found “[no] evidence that Brady was so 
gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope of leniency that he 
did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the 
advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading 
guilty.”37 Even more specifically, the Court distinguished the 
coercion it had previously found in Bram v. United States,38 
noting that “Bram dealt with a confession given by a defendant in 
custody, alone and unrepresented by counsel.”39 By contrast, 
“Bram and its progeny did not hold that the possibly coercive 
impact of a promise of leniency could not be dissipated by the 
presence and advice of counsel.”40 In effect, the presence of 
counsel dissipated the threat of the death penalty: a defendant’s 
knowledge of his options and ability to make rational decisions 
                                                                                                     
raised on federal court [absent] ‘cause’ for the default and ‘prejudice’ from failing 
to raise the claim”). 
 34. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (establishing the 
constitutionality of plea bargaining). 
 35. Id. at 742. 
 36. See id. at 749–50; see also id. at 748 n.6 (“Since an intelligent 
assessment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty is frequently impossible 
without the assistance of an attorney, this Court has scrutinized with special 
care pleas of guilty entered by defendants without the assistance of counsel and 
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel.”). 
 37. Id. at 750. 
 38. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
 39. Brady, 397 U.S. at 754. 
 40. Id. 
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that render his plea uncoerced were presumed to flow from the 
presence of counsel.  
Similarly in McMann v. Richardson,41 a companion case to 
Brady, the Court upheld a guilty plea because it was made in 
consultation with competent counsel, even though the defendant 
pled guilty because the government threatened to introduce his 
illegally obtained coerced confession.42 As Justice Brennan 
argued in dissent, the majority attached “talismanic significance 
to the presence of counsel . . . . As long as counsel is present when 
the defendant pleads, the Court is apparently willing to assume 
that the government may inject virtually any influence into the 
process of deciding on the plea.”43 
After Brady and McMann, the Court maintained its position 
that counsel presumptively cures coercion. In North Carolina v. 
Alford,44 the Court upheld the guilty plea even when the 
defendant maintained his innocence, reasoning 
[t]hat he would not have pleaded except for the opportunity to 
limit the possible [death] penalty does not necessarily 
demonstrate that the plea of guilty was not the product of a 
free and rational choice, especially where the defendant was 
represented by competent counsel whose advice was that the 
plea would be to the defendant’s advantage.45 
Likewise in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,46 the Court wrote that 
“[d]efendants advised by competent counsel and protected by 
other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of 
intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion.”47  
In effect, Brady, McMann, and their progeny elided the 
question of knowing and voluntary plea with the presence of 
                                                                                                     
 41. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 42. See id. at 769–70 (“In our view a defendant’s plea of guilty based on 
reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the 
ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s 
confession.”). 
 43. Id. at 784 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975) 
(discussing McMann). 
 44. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
 45. Id. at 31. 
 46. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
 47. Id. at 363. 
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counsel. The Court restated the proposition in 1973, stating that 
a defendant “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent 
character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he 
received from counsel was not within the [competence] 
standards.”48 As one scholar put it, after Brady “the Court treated 
the assistance of counsel as a proxy for voluntariness in pleading, 
effectively establishing that a counseled plea is presumptively 
valid.”49 In these ways, the right to counsel has come to replace 
substantive questions of coercion and voluntariness. 
B. As a Cure for Inaccuracy 
The Court also deploys counsel as a response to the threat of 
inaccuracy, on both a small and large scale. For example, in 
United States v. Wade,50 the Court established a right to counsel 
at postindictment lineups as a remedy for the problem of 
suggestiveness and inaccuracy inherent in the lineup process.51 
As the Court explained, “[P]resence of counsel itself can often 
avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at 
trial . . . . That result cannot help the guilty avoid conviction but 
can only help assure that the right man has been brought to 
justice.”52 
Wade illustrates how the right to counsel can become a 
procedural substitute for substantive underlying accuracy 
concerns.53 Postindictment defendants are not entitled to 
nonsuggestive lineups.54 Rather, they are entitled to lawyers who 
                                                                                                     
 48. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). 
 49. Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal 
Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2011, 2019 (2000). 
 50. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 51. Id. at 236–37 (“[T]he postindictment lineup was a critical stage of the 
prosecution . . . .”). 
 52. Id. at 236, 238. 
 53. See id. at 235 (“[T]he first line of defense must be the prevention of 
unfairness and the lessening of the hazards of eyewitness identification at the 
lineup itself.”). 
 54. See id. at 251 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
(“The Court assumes a narrower evil as the basis for its rule-improper police 
suggestion which contributes to erroneous identifications. The Court apparently 
believes that improper police procedures are so widespread that a broad 
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can witness suggestive lineups and challenge them later at trial 
in pursuit of more accurate results.55 Ironically, before the right 
to counsel attaches, defendants are entitled to a due process 
inquiry which asks directly about the suggestiveness and 
accuracy of the lineup procedure, that is, the real underlying 
concern.56 Because the due process standard of “unnecessary 
suggestiveness” is very hard to meet,57 as a practical matter 
Wade benefits defendants because it confers a flat postindictment 
right to counsel.58 But the right to counsel remains an indirect 
remedy or proxy for the reliability concern. 
More broadly, the Court has established counsel as an 
indicator of systemic accuracy through its ineffective assistance of 
counsel (IAC) rules. Strickland v. Washington59 holds that the 
primary purpose of the right to counsel is to ensure fair trials, by 
which it mostly means that counsel’s job is to ensure “reliable” 
results: “The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance 
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.”60 
Conversely, when counsel is constitutionally effective, we are 
entitled to treat the results not only as accurate but fair.61 
                                                                                                     
prophylactic rule must be laid down, requiring the presence of counsel at all 
pretrial identifications . . . .”). 
 55. See id. at 230 (majority opinion) (noting that a lawyer is more apt to 
protect the defendant’s rights at a lineup, because “neither witnesses nor lineup 
participants are apt to be alert for conditions prejudicial to the suspect”). 
 56. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (explaining that the 
due process inquiry weighs the witness’s “opportunity . . . to view the criminal at 
the time of the crime, [his] degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior 
description . . . , the level of certainty demonstrated . . . , and the time [elapsed]” 
against “the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself”). 
 57. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (upholding show-up of 
defendant to hospitalized witness). 
 58. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (“[T]he 
postindictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which [a 
constitutional right to counsel attached].”). 
 59. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 60. Id. at 691–92. Ensuring accuracy is not counsel’s only job, just the 
primary one. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384–85 (1986) (finding 
counsel ineffective for failing to suppress incriminating albeit reliable evidence). 
 61. See supra Part II (discussing the presumptions established when 
counsel is deemed competent). 
1062 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049 (2013) 
In the trial context,62 the Court equates the presence of 
inculpatory evidence with reliability, and in turn makes 
reliability a trigger for a finding of effective counsel.63 This move 
is instantiated in the definition of prejudice, under which it is 
very difficult for a defendant to show prejudice, and therefore 
IAC, in face of weighty evidence, no matter how deficient the 
attorney.64 As a result, in a trial in which there is substantial 
evidence, the mere presence of counsel puts an imprimatur of 
fairness and accuracy on that proceeding, since under Strickland 
that lawyer will likely be found competent.65 
The problem with this equation is that the simple existence 
of evidence does not make a conviction accurate, let alone fair. 
Scholars of wrongful convictions tell us that incompetent counsel 
is not the primary source of error in serious cases: prosecutorial 
misconduct, mistaken eyewitness identification, lying informant 
witnesses, and sloppy forensic labs are.66 They also tell us that 
defense lawyers have weak tools to combat such errors. The 
defense will be unaware of prosecutorial misconduct; mistaken 
                                                                                                     
 62. Pleas are treated somewhat differently after Lafler v. Cooper. See 
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (clarifying that in the plea 
context, the demand for a “just result” is not solely about the reliability of 
convictions but also “the fairness and regularity of the processes that preceded” 
the plea). 
 63. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“An ineffective assistance claim asserts 
the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is 
reliable . . . .”). 
 64. See id. at 710–13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (complaining that the 
majority position reduces the purpose of counsel to ensuring accuracy without 
regard to whether “fundamentally fair procedures” were used). 
 65. See id. at 694 (majority opinion) (“The defendant must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). 
 66. See BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 1–14 (2012) 
(providing an example of wrongful conviction and discussing the reasons); ROB 
WARDEN, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, THE SNITCH PROJECT 3 
(2004), http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf (identifying 
lying informants as responsible for 45.9 percent of wrongful convictions, making 
them “the leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases”). But see 
Stephen Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (“It is not the 
facts of the crime, but the quality of legal representation, that distinguishes [a] 
case, where the death penalty was imposed, from many similar cases, where it 
was not.”). 
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eyewitness testimony and lying informants are infamously 
difficult to challenge;67 and counsel may lack opportunities to 
examine evidence independent of government labs.68 In other 
words, counsel are underequipped to combat major sources of 
error even as the Court holds them up as the primary sources and 
indicia of reliable outcomes. The presence of counsel can thus 
serve to mask rather than cure inaccuracies of the process. 
C. As an Indirect Way of Evaluating the Legitimacy of Plea 
Bargains 
The Court’s new plea jurisprudence in Padilla v. Kentucky,69 
Missouri v. Frye,70 and Lafler v. Cooper71 has been hailed as the 
beginning of plea regulation. Commentators have called it a 
“watershed” moment,72 breaking “new ground,”73 and ushering in 
a “new era.”74 
Lost in the shuffle is the fact that the Court has opened the 
door to scrutinizing the plea process indirectly through the 
narrow lens of attorney competence. In other words, the Court is 
not developing a new, direct, substantive jurisprudence of 
legitimate plea bargaining, for example with notions of 
unconscionability, duress, equity, or other limitations commonly 
found in other kinds of contract law.75 Instead, the 
                                                                                                     
 67. See GARRETT, supra note 66, at 142–44 (suggesting better ways of 
dealing with lying informants and noting the problem). 
 68. See Brandon Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
383, 412 (2007) (discussing the forensic lab example). 
 69. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 70. Missouri v. Frye, 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011). 
 71. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 72. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargain Market, supra note 12, at 1118. 
 73. Nancy King, Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 29 
(2012). 
 74. Justin Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 14 U. PA. J. CON. L. 1161, 1161 (2012). But see Gerard E. Lynch, Frye 
and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 39 (2012) (arguing that Frye 
and Lafler “do not represent a novelty in the law, but rather continue the 
longstanding recognition by the courts that ‘plea bargaining’ is an integral part 
of our criminal justice system”). 
 75. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1935–36 (1992) (surveying various contractual approaches 
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Padilla/Frye/Lafler line ensures that plea bargaining will be 
scrutinized, as are so many other criminal processes and 
outcomes, centrally by reference to what the defense attorney did 
or did not do.76 Accordingly, if IAC remains the only doorway to 
judicial regulation of plea bargaining, much of that process will 
remain unregulated.77  
The counsel lens is particularly narrow in the plea 
bargaining context because defense counsel are disadvantaged in 
the bargaining process vis-à-vis prosecutors.78 Prosecutors can 
leverage overbroad laws, information imbalances, the threat of 
pretrial incarceration, and their own charging discretion to shape 
the bargaining environment of a case.79 Mandatory minimum 
sentences and heavy trial penalties often pressure defendants 
into pleading no matter how good their lawyers are.80 Insofar as 
post-Lafler courts evaluate defense counsel’s performance against 
the “market price”81 for certain offenses or ask whether defense 
counsel obtained the “expected postplea sentence,”82 they will 
effectively be asking whether defense counsel acquiesced to 
                                                                                                     
to plea bargaining). 
 76. To the extent that the Court regulates plea bargains directly, it does so 
by asking whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. As described above, 
that inquiry has also come to turn on counsel’s performance. See supra Part 
II.A–C (discussing counsel’s alleged role in preventing coercion, maintaining 
accuracy, and protecting defendants in plea bargaining). 
 77. See Lynch, supra note 74, at 41 (predicting that most IAC claims about 
attorney deficiency in the plea context will fail). But see Stephanos Bibas, 
Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 35, 37–38 (2012) (suggesting 
that post-Frye, “sentencing courts [might creatively] reduce sentences 
to approximate what the expected postplea sentence would have been”). 
 78. See Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, 
and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 919 (2004) 
(“[D]efendant class suffers from enormous disadvantages throughout the guilty 
plea process . . . .”). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (noting that a 
plea agreement waiving the defendant’s right to assess relevant information is 
not unconstitutional); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (noting 
that a prosecutor may increase charges if the defendant forgoes a plea 
agreement because “so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that 
the accused committed an offense . . . , the decision whether or not to prosecute, 
and what charge to file . . . , generally rests entirely in his discretion”). 
 80. See supra Part II.C (noting the systemic pressures a defendant faces in 
deciding whether to accept a plea bargain). 
 81. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 75, at 1923. 
 82. Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, supra note 77, at 38. 
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standard prosecutorial practices. The structural challenges of fair 
plea bargaining thus far exceed the question of counsel’s 
performance in individual cases.  
In sum, the Court has made counsel the gateway through 
which we evaluate the voluntariness of pleas, the reliability of 
outcomes, and the plea bargaining process more generally. In so 
doing, the right to counsel obscures other fairness-related 
questions such as whether the plea was coerced or substantively 
appropriate. Tracey Meares describes this trajectory in historical 
terms as a move towards rights and away from fairness.83 She 
argues that when the Court established the right to counsel as a 
matter of incorporation doctrine rather than as a matter of 
fundamental fairness, it marked a turn away from a more public-
regarding approach to criminal procedure.84 Prior to Gideon, the 
Court often decided cases not only by reference to whether a 
specific right was violated but also asked the question whether 
the criminal process was in fact fair.85 Meares argues that Gideon 
represents an abandonment of the fundamental fairness inquiry, 
which has been replaced by a more mechanistic application of 
rights.86 
The turn towards the right to counsel is a strong example of 
this trajectory. Not only has rights jurisprudence displaced the 
Court’s public-regarding fairness inquiry, the right to counsel has 
                                                                                                     
 83. See Meares, supra note 12, at 215 (“Gideon marks the beginning of a 
shift in the Court’s articulation of the requirements of fair trials away from 
notions of fundamental fairness in the Due Process Clause and toward reference 
to the Bill of Rights via the process of incorporation.”). 
 84. See id. at 221–24 (arguing that the incorporation-based reasoning to 
the right to counsel represents a marked ideological shift). 
 85. See id. at 220 (describing the earlier approach and noting the Court’s 
historical position that “[t]he criminal defendant was not the only relevant 
stakeholder in determining whether a trial was ‘fair,’” and that “the public, as 
well as criminal defendants, has an obvious interest in the fundamental fairness 
of the criminal justice system”). 
 86. See id. at 215 
Gideon, I believe, represents a break with a kind of constitutional 
decisionmaking in the criminal procedure area—a break that has 
negative consequences. Specifically, Gideon marks the beginning of a 
shift in the Court’s articulation of the requirements of fair trials away 
from notions of fundamental fairness in the Due Process Clause and 
toward reference to the Bill of Rights via the process of incorporation. 
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actually replaced other established fairness metrics such as 
coercion and accuracy. 
III. Gideon Skepticism 
Skepticism already exists about the ability of counsel to 
guarantee fairness in the ways that the Court asserts. The classic 
and most pervasive form of skepticism is instrumental: a vast 
literature maintains that because the defense bar is overworked 
and underfunded, it cannot actually perform the adversarial 
function assigned to it and therefore the right to counsel as 
currently implemented is an “empty promise,”87 a “broken 
promise,”88 and “a national disgrace.”89 Part of this conclusion 
flows from what might be labeled “Strickland skepticism,” the 
conclusion that Strickland’s low bar for attorney competence has 
effectively gutted the substantive right to counsel, thereby 
permitting this state of affairs to persist.90 This literature is 
particularly strong in the misdemeanor context: much of the 
scholarship critical of the minor offense process blames lack of 
counsel competence and resources in relation to the massive size 
of the petty docket.91 
                                                                                                     
 87. See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty 
Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HAST. 
CONST. L.Q. 625, 625 (1986). 
 88. See AM. BAR ASSOC. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR 
EQUAL JUSTICE 1 (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_i
n_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (“[F]orty years after the Gideon 
decision, the promise of equal justice for the poor remains unfulfilled in this 
country.”). 
 89. See Deborah Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 869, 894 (2009) (“In many jurisdictions, the current system 
of indigent defense is a national disgrace.”). 
 90. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: 
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 680 
(2007) (“[T]here is no effective remedy for defendants whose attorneys are 
constitutionally deficient at trial.”). 
 91. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASSN. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN 
MISDEMEANOR COURTS 39–45 (2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/Work 
Area/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=20808 (noting a lack of standards and a 
lack of experienced counsel in misdemeanor cases); John D. King, Beyond “Life and 
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A different, smaller literature suggests that defense counsel 
cannot perform its assigned functions for structural reasons, not 
because lawyers lack the time or ability, but because the very 
nature of plea bargaining or sentencing prevents it. For example, 
Albert Alschuler has long maintained that defense counsel 
cannot, as the Court assumes, counter the inherent coerciveness 
of the plea process and in fact have become its handmaidens.92  
Indeed, the record in Brady suggests that the principal 
function of a competent attorney in the guilty-plea system is 
exactly the opposite of the function suggested by the Supreme 
Court. Rather than dispel the coercive impact of a promise of 
leniency, the attorney must make the defendant realize with 
full clarity the coercive power of the alternatives that he 
faces.93 
Or as Stephanos Bibas points out, in a world dominated by plea 
bargaining, defense lawyers are part and parcel of the market 
process, not a counterweight to it.94 
The rigidity of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) 
has also generated concerns about the waning influence of the 
defense function. As Margareth Etienne explains, the Guidelines 
                                                                                                     
Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2013) 
(arguing that the misdemeanor courts unjustly focus on process costs rather 
than a defendant’s guilt or innocence); J.D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral 
Consequences, and the Adjudication of Misdemeanors, in THE PROSECUTOR IN 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 21 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2011) 
(“[V]olume is the most salient factor . . . . By all accounts, prosecutors, courts, 
and defense attorneys are swamped . . . .”); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors 
Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 277, 277 (2011) (noting a crisis of “widespread lack of zealous 
representation for indigent people charged with misdemeanors” and observing 
that “[m]any individuals charged with low-level crimes receive representation 
from defense attorneys with overwhelming caseloads, in a criminal justice 
system singularly focused on rapid finality in the large numbers of docketed 
cases”). 
 92. Albert Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the 
Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 58 (1975) (arguing that defense counsel alone 
cannot counter the coerciveness of the plea process). 
 93. Id.; see also Albert Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975) (“Today’s guilty-plea system leads 
even able, conscientious, and highly motivated attorneys to make decisions that 
are not really in their clients’ interests.”). 
 94. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargain Market, supra note 12, at 1140–
41 (“While the plea bargaining market is grossly flawed in other ways, the fault 
does not lie with defense lawyers who are simply doing their jobs.”). 
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fundamentally altered the nature of counsel’s role.95 For example, 
the “acceptance of responsibility” provision confers a benefit on 
defendants who do not contest the charges against them.96 
Etienne found this to have a chilling effect on defense advocacy 
because judges may impose higher sentences on defendants 
whose lawyers mount zealous defenses.97 Second, and more 
broadly, the Guidelines confer significant and lopsided bargaining 
power on the prosecution, limiting counsel’s advocacy, 
substantive arguments, and negotiation options.98 Etienne 
concludes that these provisions have fundamentally curtailed 
defense lawyering in lasting ways, and that “the Guidelines have 
dramatically altered what it means to be a criminal defense 
lawyer in federal court and, relatedly, what the right to have a 
lawyer means to a federal criminal defendant.”99 
In a somewhat different vein, the innocence discourse has 
given rise to what might be called an “accuracy movement” in 
which evidentiary accuracy has become the touchstone of 
systemic fairness. Accuracy advocates often deemphasize the 
right to counsel, not because they consider it unimportant, but 
because they see other reforms as more directly relevant to the 
                                                                                                     
 95. See Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in 
Federal Criminal Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense 
Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 434–36 
(2004) [hereinafter Etienne, Declining Utility] (“These policy decisions have 
greatly affected what defense lawyers do as advocates and what it means to be 
represented by counsel.”); Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility and 
Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants Pays for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2108 (2003) (“Permitting the federal sentencing laws or 
individual judges to undermine the accepted rationale behind the laws of ethics 
and professionalism is bad policymaking and results in poorly conceived norms 
of advocacy.”).  
 96. See Etienne, Declining Utility, supra note 95, at 446 (“While the 
acceptance of responsibility provision presents defendants with the possible 
benefit of lowering their sentences by three levels, this opportunity is not 
without its costs.”). 
 97. See id. at 447 (“[L]awyers worry that the defendant might be denied 
acceptance of responsibility based on the cumulative number of motions and 
arguments they make or their general aggressiveness in contesting specific 
aspects of the government’s case.”). 
 98. See id. at 475 (“Attorneys decried their own disempowerment as 
lawyers under the federal scheme. They described feeling powerless as 
advocates in the face of tremendously high stakes in which prosecutors ‘hold 
[all] the cards.’”). 
 99. Id. at 431. 
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core concern of improving accurate case outcomes.100 Forensic lab 
reform, recording lineups and interrogations, DNA collection, and 
other such accuracy-oriented reforms reflect an indirect form of 
Gideon skepticism in the sense that they displace the right to 
counsel as the central mechanism by which evidentiary accuracy 
is guaranteed.101 Instead, police investigation is seen as the 
primary locus of error in which direct regulation—not adversarial 
testing—is the best path to accuracy.  
In an article entitled The Decline of Defense Counsel and the 
Rise of Accuracy, Darryl Brown articulates the crux of this 
skepticism.102 He argues that the role of defense counsel is in 
decline along with the demise of the adjudicative process, and 
that, in a world dominated by plea bargains, this is not such a 
bad thing.103 He surmises that “[b]etter crime-lab funding, 
scientifically grounded methodologies, and accreditors’ scrutiny 
improve forensic evidence reliability as much as—and probably 
more than—defense-attorney scrutiny. Thus, crime labs can 
replace part of the function of diminished defense counsel.”104 
Ultimately, the idea goes, if police investigations were sufficiently 
accurate, the need for counsel might wither away. 
A final form of Gideon skepticism points to evidence that, 
under some circumstances, having a lawyer can actually make 
things worse for defendants. Erica Hashimoto concludes that in 
federal misdemeanor court, pro se defendants may obtain better 
outcomes than when they are represented.105 Similarly, one study 
                                                                                                     
 100. See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of 
Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2005) (“Right-to-
counsel (and later, effective-assistance) cases repeatedly described defense 
lawyers as improving the accuracy of adjudication. But defense counsel’s 
commitment is not to accuracy; it is to his or her clients, many of whom want 
inaccuracy to mask their guilt.”). 
 101. See id. at 1613 (noting administrative and scientific means of 
improving trial accuracy). 
 102. See id. at 1591 (critiquing the ability of the Gideon-based system of 
“adversarial advocacy” to provide for accuracy in criminal defense and 
describing “a new model” that “use[s] executive and judicial actors to 
supplement weak defense counsel in the task of improving evidence reliability”). 
 103. See id. at 1591–92 (arguing that alternative efforts to “improve the 
quality of investigation” serve in part “to compensate for weaknesses of 
adversarial adjudication”). 
 104. Id. at 1643. 
 105. See Erica Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. 
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found that in certain jurisdictions, juveniles without counsel are 
treated more leniently than those with counsel.106 This perception 
that lawyers may make life harder for their clients while 
maintaining the appearance of fairness led one commentator to 
argue against importing the right to counsel into the civil context, 
arguing that “Gideon has worked out great for everyone in the 
system except criminal defendants.”107 
IV. Gideon Skepticism in the Misdemeanor System 
Such skepticism about the regulatory efficacy of the right to 
counsel should be extended to the massive petty offense system. 
Most misdemeanor counsel as a practical matter cannot provide a 
zealous defense, or sometimes any defense at all, due to 
underfunding and massive caseloads. But even misdemeanants 
with highly skilled, committed counsel with time to litigate still 
suffer the systemic harms of the petty offense machinery. The 
worst features of the petty offense process—its indiscriminate 
sweep and racial skew—flow in large part from urban policing 
practices in which minor arrests are used to implement order 
maintenance policies.108 Such stops and arrests often occur 
without evidentiary basis, driven by neighborhood demographics 
rather than evidence of wrongdoing.109 The dignitary and liberty 
                                                                                                     
& MARY L. REV. 461, 490–94 (2007) (observing that pro se defendants in the 
study overall attained better sentencing outcomes than represented 
defendants). 
 106. See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An 
Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1237–38 (1989) (“[Y]ouths with attorneys are 
between two and three times more likely to receive severe dispositions than are 
those youths without counsel.”). 
 107. Ben Barton, Against Civil Gideon (And For Pro Se Court Reform), 62 
FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2010). 
 108. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 13, at 1331, 1334–35 
(describing how arrests are often made in certain urban areas for “zero tolerance 
and order maintenance” policies and these arrests often occur in “poor minority 
communities and high-volume policing contexts” and may include racial 
profiling). 
 109. See id. at 1331–35 (describing that a number of arrests in urban 
policing lack probable cause, implicate innocent people, and “create high risks of 
evidentiarily weak arrests”); see also Natapoff, Aggregation, supra note 13, at 
17–20 (describing numerous class action lawsuits against New York Police 
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harms that result from baseless stops and arrests, or from 
selection processes tainted by race and class, occur long before 
counsel is appointed.  
Even with respect to the adversarial process for which 
defense lawyers are best equipped, misdemeanor counsel play a 
limited role. As law professor and public advocate Chris 
Fabricant wrote during his time in the Bronx Defenders office, 
“well over half of my cases are misdemeanors, and I have had a 
disgraceful number of innocent clients, many of whom plead 
guilty.”110 
Fabricant’s innocent clients pled because of a series of 
structural features of the petty offense process: they were 
selected for arrest in the first place through racially skewed 
order-maintenance policing; they faced prolonged incarceration 
because they couldn’t make bail; the police submitted generic 
evidence that was tolerated and accepted by the high-volume, low 
scrutiny court system; and they came from a social environment 
in which criminal convictions were a common fact of life and 
therefore easier to accept.111 In other words, they pled because of 
factors that their attorney could do little or nothing about.  
To put it another way, to say “[t]he process is the 
punishment”112 is to recognize that the misdemeanor system 
burdens and pressures defendants regardless of the evidence, 
their rights, or their culpability—in other words, the things that 
lawyers are supposed to address.113 A recent study of the New 
                                                                                                     
Department alleging baseless and racially-motivated arrest practices); infra 
note 123 and accompanying text (citing these lawsuits). 
 110. M. Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops: One Man Stands up to the 
NYPD’s Apartheid-Like Trespassing Crackdown, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 30, 2007. 
 111. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING 
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199–243 (Russell Sage Foundation, New 
York, 1979) (describing common attributes of a criminal defendant and the 
pretrial process including pretrial release, representation, and the fact that 
while Connecticut, the state at issue in this study, has a liberal pretrial release 
policy, those that are detained before trial are more likely to plead guilty); see 
also id. at 27–28 (describing reasons for plea bargaining as avoidance of the 
expense and “spectacle” of a “public trial”); id. at 46–47 (describing the relatively 
amicable relationship between police and prosecutor); id. at 149–51 (describing 
the constraints on case preparation for both prosecutors and defense attorneys 
that reduce the level of scrutiny applied to evidence and other factors). 
 112. Id. at 199.  
 113. See id. at 199–201 (referring to characteristics of the process that 
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York lower court system found that even defendants who had 
their cases dismissed—the gold standard of good defense 
lawyering—still suffered numerous restrictions on their time, 
resources, and liberty, and were handled in disrespectful, 
marking and controlling ways that left significant injuries.114 
Josh Bowers makes a similar point when he argues that for 
most defendants, it makes sense to take a plea to a misdemeanor 
even if they are innocent.115 Penalties are standardized and low 
and many defendants have a prior record, making a new 
conviction less socially costly.116 By contrast, the costs of 
contesting the charge may be high, including time in jail, the 
need for continuous court appearances, and the risk of a much 
higher sentence after trial.117 In a world where it makes sense 
even for innocent defendants to plead guilty, there is not much 
left for defense counsel to do. In this view, not only defense 
attorneys but the adversarial truth-seeking process itself has 
become increasingly irrelevant.118 
                                                                                                     
burden defendants as opposed to issues that would otherwise be of concern to 
defense attorneys, such as “an immediate concern for return to work or their 
children,” where the costs of the length of process exceed that of a conviction and 
sentence). 
 114. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: The Penal Logic of 
Dismissal 22, 27–29 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (describing the 
various hassles criminal defendants experience and stating that “there is not a 
single defendant whose case was eventually dismissed that did not experience 
the imprint of penal power through some aspect of the inevitable procedures of 
case adjudication”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 115. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 
1119–20 (2008) (“For the typical innocent defendant in the typical case—which I 
will demonstrate is a recidivist facing petty charges—the best resolution is 
generally a quick plea in exchange for a light, bargained-for sentence.”). 
 116. See id. at 1121–22 (indicating that “most innocent defendants are 
probably recidivists,” which encourages plea-bargaining but makes it difficult to 
prove innocence, and stating that most pleas lead to “trivial sentences” that 
avoid the “pretrial process” that functions as punishment before a defendant is 
ever sentenced). 
 117. See id. at 1132–34 (describing process costs for defendants that elect to 
go to trial, including “weeks or months” of pretrial appearances and other 
matters before trial, with often higher costs for those who are innocent “because 
they are more likely to put forward positive defenses”). 
 118. See id. at 1122–23 (arguing that for innocents in low-stakes cases, 
“[t]he adversarial model breaks down, or at least becomes a secondary 
consideration to workgroup cooperative principles,” so “[f]or all involved, the 
best pleas are quick pleas” that “are most efficiently reached at low market 
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Insofar as the adversarial process is not dead, Fabricant’s 
story reminds us of what lawyers are good for.119 When he got a 
“unique” client who wanted to fight his trespassing charge and 
forego the plea offer of community service, Fabricant marshaled 
evidence, resisted the routine conviction process, and obtained an 
acquittal.120 But the case is hardly representative: Fabricant was 
working in one of the most lauded public defender offices in the 
country and he had an atypical client who was willing to risk 
imprisonment on principle.121 Indeed, it was Fabricant’s only 
trespassing trial.122 A system in which it takes a unique 
defendant to fully benefit from a stellar lawyer’s skills is not a 
system in which defense counsel are guaranteeing much 
fairness.123 
V. Alternative Models of Guaranteeing Fairness 
The scale and institutionalization of the modern 
misdemeanor system have hollowed out the ability of individual 
defense counsel to make the system work fairly. This invites 
consideration of alternative mechanisms, not to replace counsel 
but to complement the outdated individual advocacy model. 
                                                                                                     
prices”). 
 119. See Fabricant, supra note 110 (describing the case of David M., in 
which David turned down a plea deal and chose to go to trial, relying on 
Fabricant to challenge the witness testimony of an officer who testified to 
arresting David despite having not actually conducted the arrest). 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. (stating that Fabricant was a staff attorney at the Bronx 
Defenders and that David M. turned down a plea deal of “seven days of 
community service and five for social service” to go to trial, risking “a lifelong 
criminal record,” fines, and “maybe even more jail time”). 
 122. See id. (observing that while he had other trespassing cases, none had 
previously gone to trial before the trespassing case discussed in the article). 
 123. The NYPD’s trespassing policies are currently the subject of a class 
action civil rights lawsuit. See Amended Complaint at 1–5, Davis v. City of New 
York, No. 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2012) (challenging certain New 
York trespass enforcement activities in public housing areas as violations of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and federal civil rights acts); see also 
Complaint at 1–4, Ligon v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 2274 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
28, 2012) (challenging NY police program “Operation Clean Halls” in which 
police stop, search, and arrest residents of public housing projects typically for 
the offense of trespassing). 
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There are at least three alternatives: (1) strengthen the public 
defender office as an institutional actor, (2) draft other 
institutional actors—especially prosecutors but also courts—into 
greater service on behalf of systemic fairness, and (3) empower 
criminal defendants. 
A. The Public Defender Office as an Institutional Force 
There are significant legal and ethical barriers faced by 
public defender offices when contemplating collective action and 
an institutional approach to indigent representation.124 The 
central legal impediment is the individualized model of client 
representation itself: office-wide policies that may benefit the 
defendant class, the community, or both may conflict with a 
defendant’s interests in an individual case.125 But there have 
nevertheless been instances in which defender offices have 
collectively and successfully opposed prosecutorial policies or 
sought to change court practices. For example, defender offices 
have taken institutional stances on appeal,126 resisted 
prosecutorial demands for appeal waivers,127 and fought to 
                                                                                                     
 124. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: 
Alternative Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2422 (1996) 
(criticizing tendency of public defender offices to “uncritically accept 
individualized concepts of their role”); see also Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of 
Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as 
Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1235–43 (2005) [hereinafter 
Etienne, Cause Lawyering] (describing ethical impediments to collective public 
defender action but also describing instances where defender offices collectively 
resisted prosecutorial policies). 
 125. See Etienne, Cause Lawyering, supra note 124, at 1235–36 (indicating 
that while collective action would allow many defendants in aggregate to 
benefit, the brunt of costs would be borne up front by the first few to attempt to 
demand trials, contrary to their own interests and those of defense attorneys 
charged with representing them individually). 
 126. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 59, at 2456 n.137 (describing an 
organizing principle of preserving life of the client for offices defending clients 
on death row that “may, for example, sometimes prompt a defender to file 
appeals even if the client indicates a desire to cease fighting his execution”). 
 127. See Etienne, Cause Lawyering, supra note 124, at 1236–39 (describing 
various strategies used by certain private and public criminal defense attorneys 
against a federal policy seeking to standardize no-waiver plea agreements, 
including successful collective approaches). 
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expand the availability of Miranda warnings to non-English 
speakers.128 
Robin Steinberg proposes an institutional model of “holistic 
defense” in which public defender offices address not only the 
substance of criminal cases but a whole host of collateral, civil, 
and personal problems generated by the criminal process.129 
Similarly, the NYU Brennan Center’s Community-Oriented 
Defender Network takes the collective action idea beyond the 
courtroom.130 The Center argues that in order to ensure fairness 
for defendants within the legal system, public defender officers 
should also work actively with communities and social service 
providers to “break the continuing cycle of individuals’ encounters 
with the criminal and juvenile justice systems . . . . This includes 
systemic reform of failing criminal justice policies, and enlistment 
of community members and institutions in problem-solving 
ventures.”131 The idea is that Gideon’s promise of a fair defense is 
not only about individual cases but includes institutional work on 
criminal justice and related social welfare policies. For example, 
the San Francisco Public Defender Office partners with social 
service organizations to provide services to at-risk youth, above 
and beyond their legal representation needs.132 In Minneapolis, 
the Legal Rights Center “has engaged in partnerships with the 
public schools, a women’s prison, the child protective agency, and 
the police department to enable methods of reconciliation that 
avoid court intervention.”133 Numerous other defender 
                                                                                                     
 128. See id. at 1240–42 (discussing collective approaches to ensure the 
provision of Miranda rights in Spanish to Spanish-speaking defendants facing 
arrest). 
 129. See generally Robin Steinberg, Heeding Gideon’s Call in the Twenty-
first Century: Holistic Defense and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 961 (2013). 
 130. See MELANCA CLARK & EMILY SAVNER, COMMUNITY ORIENTED DEFENSE: 
STRONGER PUBLIC DEFENDERS 7 (Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of 
Law 2010), http://brennan.3cdn.net/930f13b765ab919c80_ylm6beoe2.pdf. 
 131. Id. at 11. 
 132. Id. at 27–28 (describing two partnership programs between the 
community programs for adolescents and the Reentry Unit of the San Francisco 
Public Defender’s office). 
 133. Id. at 27. 
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organizations work with other institutions as a way of 
“reimagining the role of the traditional defender.”134 
Such efforts reconceptualize public defender offices as an 
influence not only on the application of legal rules in specific 
cases but on larger power dynamics and social policies that shape 
the criminal justice institution. Despite funding and legal 
barriers, public defender offices thus have various institutional 
opportunities to improve the fairness and responsiveness of the 
criminal process vis-à-vis defendants. Such an institutional 
approach expands the classic Gideon/Strickland lens: instead of 
asking only what an individual lawyer could or should have done 
in an individual case, we can ask more broadly how legal 
advocacy on behalf of defendants as a class might render the 
system fairer and more responsive. 
B. Gideon Versus Brady 
By its nature, the dominant Gideon model of fairness 
revolves around defense counsel. But Brady v. Maryland offers an 
alternative way of thinking about fairness by shifting 
responsibility to the prosecutor.135 Indeed, the Brady Court 
imposed its famous disclosure obligations explicitly to promote 
systemic fairness and in recognition of the central role played by 
prosecutors in ensuring that justice is done: “Society wins not 
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are 
fair.”136 
Brady is one of those rare doctrines in which the evaluation 
of fairness is unmediated by defense counsel: either the 
prosecution disclosed or it didn’t.137 Brady stands for the 
                                                                                                     
 134. Id. at 14. 
 135. See Bennett Gershmann, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 685, 686 (2006) (“More than any other rule of criminal procedure, Brady 
has illuminated the prosecutor’s constitutional and ethical obligations to ensure 
that defendants receive fair trials . . . .”). 
 136. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“The United States wins its 
point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.” (internal quotations 
omitted)); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (describing the 
prosecutor as “the representative . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done” (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))). 
 137. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“We now hold that the suppression by the 
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proposition that fair process is also the responsibility of the 
prosecutor, that the prosecutor is charged with “doing justice” 
rather than merely obtaining convictions, and it serves as the 
spiritual counterweight to the adversarial model in which each 
side dukes it out as hard as they can.138 Indeed, even as Meares 
mourned the Court’s abandonment of the due process-based 
inquiry, she noted that the “Court did not completely abandon 
fundamental fairness analysis in constitutional criminal 
procedure in the modern era,” citing Brady as the main 
counterexample.139 
Of course Brady stands for a much narrower proposition than 
Gideon: prosecutors need merely disclose exculpatory evidence, 
whereas Gideon established a structural entitlement to advocacy 
writ large. Nevertheless, Brady contains the seeds of the idea 
that counsel is not a defendant’s only representative. 
In practice, the Brady rule has not worked this way.140 
Prosecutorial violations are widespread,141 and Brady is widely 
viewed as having failed as a fairness guarantor.142 One might say 
that Brady didn’t change the adversarial structure so much as 
                                                                                                     
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
 138. See id. at 87–88 (“A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of 
an accused which . . . would tend to exculpate . . . or reduce the penalty helps 
shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in 
the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with . . . 
justice . . . .”). 
 139. Meares, supra note 12, at 224. 
 140. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360–64 (2011) 
(declining to find a civil rights violation where the prosecutor’s office violated 
Brady). 
 141. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the 
Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2090 (2010) (noting that Brady 
violations are “one of the most common types of prosecutorial misconduct”). 
 142. See Lisa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming 
Brady, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 969, 970 (2011–2012) (“[I]t has been almost 
universally acknowledged that [the Brady] requirements have not resulted in 
sufficient disclosure by prosecutors.”); see also Alafair Burke, Revisiting 
Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 483–84 (2009) (exploring how the 
Brady doctrine inherently fails to ensure disclosure); Gershmann, supra note 
135, at 687–88 (“Brady has failed as a discovery doctrine. Brady is insufficiently 
enforced when violations are discovered, and virtually unenforceable when 
violations are hidden . . . . The extent to which prosecutors fail to discharge their 
Brady obligations . . . is almost impossible to measure accurately.”). 
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succumb to it. Nevertheless, those due process-based 
responsibilities stand as a reminder that prosecutors have 
structural obligations to ensure that defendants are treated 
fairly.  
In that spirit, various commentators have proposed a more 
expansive understanding, and commensurately more rigorous 
regulation, of the prosecutorial role. For example, Stephanos 
Bibas argues that in light of the Court’s new appreciation of 
prosecutorial power in plea bargaining, prosecutors should play a 
greater role in ensuring clarity and fairness of those bargains.143 
Dan Medwed argues for tighter regulation of prosecutorial 
decision-making, given institutional pressures and psychological 
biases that impede fair and accurate decisionmaking.144 Rachel 
Barkow proposes applying principles of administrative law to 
prosecutorial offices in order to curtail the dangers of unchecked 
prosecutorial powers.145 Angela Davis suggests developing 
prosecutorial racial impact statements to monitor the racial 
effects of charging practices.146 Each of these proposals recognizes 
that we live in a universe in which the prosecutor—not defense 
counsel or even the court—holds many if not most of the cards, 
and that therefore it makes sense to impose on those powerful 
                                                                                                     
 143. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 12, at 
1145–46, 1156–57 (arguing that prosecutors should be aware of collateral 
consequences in offering pleas to improve the bargaining process and that as 
“repeat players,” prosecutors are in a better position to provide clearer terms 
and should clarify what terms are being imposed). 
 144. See DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO 
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (NYU Press, 2012) (documenting how 
prosecutors experience professional incentives and psychological pressures that 
contribute to wrongful convictions); see also Fred Zacharias, The Role of 
Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171, 230–38 
(2005) (discussing potential regulatory measures to address problems of 
prosecutor discretion in the postconviction or sentencing context). 
 145. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of 
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 870–74 
(2009) (providing an overview of the powerful position federal prosecutors 
occupy and recommending the use of a “model from administrative law” such as 
the separation of investigative and advocate functions from adjudicative 
functions). 
 146. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice 
System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 219–24 
(2007) (advocating that prosecutors conduct racial impact studies of their own 
charging practices). 
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players greater responsibilities for the overall integrity of the 
system. 
In the misdemeanor context, prosecutors have two main jobs: 
deciding whether to convert arrests into formal criminal charges, 
and running the plea process. In the first arena, greater 
prosecutorial responsibility might include more rigorous 
screening, both for evidentiary validity and for racial impact.147 
In jurisdictions with low declination rates, prosecutors effectively 
validate policing policies by converting arrests more or less 
automatically into formal charges.148 Were prosecutors to 
scrutinize arrests more heavily, it would increase the integrity of 
the resulting convictions. Indeed, this is already occurring in a 
limited way in New York, where the Bronx District Attorney’s 
Office has instituted more rigorous screening of trespassing cases 
in recognition of the flaws of the policing process.149 More 
fundamentally, prosecutors are in a position to decide whether 
petty offenses like trespassing, loitering, and disorderly conduct 
should translate into convictions at all, or whether such conduct 
should be diverted out of the already overwhelmed criminal 
justice system.  
With respect to pleas, the lack of true adversariality in the 
petty offense process places prosecutors in a more powerful and 
therefore more responsible relationship to defendants. The 
misdemeanor process thus offers an opportunity to shake up the 
prosecutorial conviction bias, a bias that might be defensible 
when more culpable conduct has been alleged but is mostly 
bureaucratic habit when the underlying offense is truly minor.150 
                                                                                                     
 147. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31–36 (2002) (advocating for greater prosecutorial screening 
as alternative to the plea-bargaining versus criminal trial dichotomy of dealing 
with those arrested and charged); see also Davis, supra note 146, at 206 
(“[A]lthough police officers bring individuals into the system with the arrest 
power, only prosecutors have the power to formally charge them with crimesa 
power that often predetermines their fate.”). 
 148. See Wright & Miller, supra note 147, at 34 (indicating that declination 
rates refer to “refusals to prosecute a case after the police recommend charges”). 
 149. See Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012, at A1 (describing a policy implemented in July of 
2012 by the Bronx District Attorney’s office to not prosecute a charge of trespass 
of a public housing unit, because many so charged have been innocent, “unless 
the arresting officer is interviewed to ensure that the arrest was warranted”). 
 150. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
1080 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049 (2013) 
With an understanding that not all misdemeanor arrests need or 
should result in convictions, prosecutors could take steps to 
ensure that defendants don’t plead just to get out of jail, that 
defendants understand the collateral consequences of pleading 
guilty, and in general that petty convictions and their 
consequences reflect more substantive determinations of 
culpability rather than institutional charging practices and 
overbroad laws.151 
C. Educate Misdemeanor Defendants 
One of the great, seemingly intractable sources of unfairness 
in the criminal system is that most defendants have a limited 
ability to stand up for themselves, either pro se before a tribunal, 
or in relationship to their own lawyers.152 This inability is a 
function both of the technical and specialized nature of law itself, 
and the fact that most of the criminal justice population is poor, 
undereducated, suffering from substance abuse and/or mental 
health challenges, and thus in a poor position to understand their 
legal options or advocate for themselves.153  
In many ways, the right to counsel is the system’s proffered 
antidote to the social disadvantages that wrack the defendant 
pool. The model is that even the poorest subliterate defendant 
                                                                                                     
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2472 (2004) (“[Prosecutors’] psychology of risk aversion and 
loss aversion reinforces the structural incentives to ensure good statistics and 
avoid risking losses.”). 
 151. This is Josh Bowers’s point about the need for misdemeanor 
prosecutors, or if not them, then some decisional actor, to hew more closely to 
questions of normative rather than legal guilt. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, 
Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1655, 1705–10 (2010). 
 152. I have written about this phenomenon more extensively elsewhere. See 
Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2005) [hereinafter Natapoff, Speechless] (“Defendant 
silence thus extends beyond the courtroom. It is part of a larger phenomenon of 
expressive disempowerment of those disadvantaged groups who tend to become 
defendants: racial minorities, the poor, the undereducated or illiterate, 
juveniles, the unemployed, or people with criminal histories, mental health or 
substance abuse problems.”). 
 153. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 140–41 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (surveying illiteracy statistics and concluding that most defendants 
do “not possess the skill necessary to pursue a competent pro se appeal”). 
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will be treated fairly if they have counsel. But whatever its merits 
for serious cases, this model breaks down in the misdemeanor 
system in which counsel’s abilities to counter unfairness are 
structurally limited and heavy caseloads undermine the 
possibilities of the attorney–client relationship itself.154 A 
defendant whose lawyer takes ten minutes in a courthouse 
hallway to convey a plea offer is unlikely to feel either that his 
lawyer truly functioned as his representative, or that he had 
much choice about the resolution of his case.155 
If lawyers are not enough to ensure a fair fight between 
defendants and the state, then defendants need more personal 
ammunition. This idea is implicit in the recognition that wealthy, 
well-educated, empowered defendants are better situated, not 
only because they can afford better representation, but because 
they have more self-confidence, a better understanding of their 
options, and may be more likely to stand up for themselves 
against the government.156 In that vein, we might decide to 
educate and support vulnerable misdemeanor defendants 
directly, giving them the knowledge and tools to develop stronger 
understanding and confidence about their legal choices, rather 
than assuming that a lawyer alone will confer those things. This 
is especially appropriate in misdemeanor court where defendants 
typically get scant time with their attorneys and are therefore 
                                                                                                     
 154. See Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 152, at 1459–63 (discussing the 
need for counsel to consider the potential for perjury from even truthful 
defendants when testifying against the prosecutor’s case, prejudicial effects of a 
defendant’s criminal history that prevent a defendant from speaking on his or 
her own behalf, and limitations on attorney-client communication in 
overburdened systems). 
 155. See id. at 1462–63 
In overburdened state courts, it is not uncommon for a defendant to 
meet his public defender, hear about the deal, and decide what to 
do—all in the span of less than an hour and within the confines of a 
court lock-up or hallway while waiting to go into court. 
 156. See, e.g., Janet Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of 
Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 275–92 (1993) 
(documenting subordinated female linguistic responses to police assertions of 
authority); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and 
Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 
536–42 (1992) (describing the difficulty that poor tenants had in asserting 
themselves in court); Devon Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 946, 952 (2002) (describing African Americans’ “racial dis-ease” 
with their subordinate position and vulnerability to police). 
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presumed to understand and consent to their convictions based 
on little or no consultation. 
The idea that the criminal system should directly educate 
defendants is not as farfetched as it may seem. We often rely on 
educating defendants through warnings and judicial colloquies to 
ensure or enhance defendant understanding and choice. Rule 11 
requires judges to engage defendants directly to ascertain, and 
improve if necessary, their personal understanding of their own 
pleas.157 The idea behind the Miranda warning is that the final 
guarantor of fairness is the well-informed suspect who makes 
choices on his own.158 While these strategies have been widely 
criticized as ineffective in practice,159 the system nevertheless 
relies on the idea of direct defendant education as a way of 
guaranteeing the fairness of convictions. 
Even in the felony context, such proposals are not unheard 
of. For example, Bibas’s proposal for clearer, standardized plea 
agreements is effectively an effort to strengthen defendants’ 
personal ability to engage in meaningful plea bargaining.160 As 
described above, community-oriented defense often includes a 
community legal education component.161 Outside the formal 
criminal system, Street Law and other know-your-rights 
                                                                                                     
 157. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (noting that prior to accepting a guilty plea a 
judge “must address the defendant personally in open court” after the defendant 
has been sworn in and “inform the defendant of, and determine that the 
defendant understands,” his or her rights and the terms and consequences of 
pleading). 
 158. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (“In order to combat 
these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of 
his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the 
Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 773, 773 (2009) (noting that many consider Miranda to have been a 
“spectacular failure”). 
 160. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 12, at 1153–
56 (proposing ways of improving defendant comprehension of plea bargains 
modeled on other consumer protections, for example by putting them in writing, 
using standardized terms, and creating cooling–off periods). 
 161. See CLARK & SAVNER, supra note 130, at 19–27 (describing different 
programs at public defender offices that incorporate community education on 
legal matters, such as DefensaNDS in Harlem, which informs clients of “lateral 
consequences of conviction,” and MAGIC programs in San Francisco, which 
“empower[] community organizations to solve systemic problems”). 
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programs educate young people about the choices they may need 
to make before they ever encounter the criminal system.162 In 
these various ways, people working in and around the criminal 
system view defendant education as an important component of a 
fair system in light of the sometimes limited role that counsel can 
realistically play.163 
To be sure, the idea of educating defendants outside the 
attorney–client relationship is in tension with the traditional 
lawyering model. That model relies heavily on counsel to educate 
defendants and to help them shape their cases; going outside that 
relationship for information or direction is disfavored. Indeed, 
courts are sometimes considered to be in a bind if they perceive 
counsel to be functioning inadequately, on the theory that court 
intervention might constitute interference with the primary 
attorney–client relationship.164 The ABA Model Rules caution 
lawyers against providing legal advice to represented parties.165 
In sum, there is not a lot of procedural room for someone other 
than a defendant’s attorney to educate and advise him about his 
case. Nevertheless, in jurisdictions where attorneys spend scant 
minutes advising their clients to plead to minor offenses, there is 
more conceptual space to bolster defendant understanding 
through other sources.  
Direct defendant education is not a substitute for counsel, 
although in practice it might lead to more pro se representation. 
Rather, it should be understood as part of the genre of practices 
                                                                                                     
 162. See, e.g., Civic & Law-Related Education, STREET LAW, http://www. 
streetlaw.org/en/topics/civic__lawrelated_education (last visited Apr. 3, 2013) 
(describing Street Law’s legal education resources and providing relevant links) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 163. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 107, at 1233–34 (arguing that a strong pro 
se court system would serve poor civil litigants better than a right to counsel). 
 164. See William Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent Counsel—The Trial 
Judge’s Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633, 637 (1980) (“[Judicial] [i]ntervention does 
present certain undeniable difficulties. It requires the judge to depart from his 
traditional neutral rule. Moreover, inquiry into counsel’s litigation strategy 
could jeopardize the confidential relationship between counsel and client and 
impair the adversary process.”). 
 165. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1983) (barring 
communication with “a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer”). But see id. at cmt. 4 (“Nor does this Rule preclude communication with 
a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise 
representing a client in the matter.”). 
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in which people making life-altering decisions get general 
counseling or preliminary education before entering into the 
actual decision-making process. Low income homebuyers, for 
example, may receive financial literacy training before reading 
and signing a mortgage.166 Patients may receive health literacy 
coaching before consulting with an actual surgeon.167 Of course 
such counseling is the prototypical lawyer’s job, but misdemeanor 
counsel typically lack time to perform this educational role, and 
even when they do it, they do so in the time-pressured context of 
the actual plea decision in which defendants may not be able to 
sort through large amounts of information to make an informed 
decision.168 Accordingly, we can think of direct defendant 
education as a way of preparing defendants to work with their 
overburdened lawyers. 
Some such educational strategies already exist. The Marin 
County Public Defender, for example, produced a bilingual 
informational video on DUI offenses, explaining the basic process 
and answering frequently asked questions in both English and 
Spanish.169 The videos are posted on the office webpage and on 
YouTube.170 The Washoe County Public Defender’s office in 
Nevada worked with the University of Nevada School of Social 
Work to establish a student internship in which social work 
                                                                                                     
 166. See Lauren E. Willis, Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Education, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 433 
(2009) (“A frequently cited analysis by Hirad and Zorn of participants in Freddie 
Mac’s Affordable Gold mortgage program found that, controlling for selection 
effects, classroom-based homeownership counseling significantly reduced 
mortgage delinquency rates.”). 
 167. See Brietta Clark, Using Law to Fight a Silent Epidemic: The Role of 
Health Literacy in Health Care Access, Quality & Cost, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
253, 278–79 (2011) (describing forms of “patient coaching” that are used to 
“empower patients to ask the right questions to help them make medical 
decisions about diagnostic or treatment options”). 
 168. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lender”A 
Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
893, 915–17 (2012) (describing the certain psychological factors that imposed 
limits on effective decision-making including “distressed abbreviated reasoning 
patterns” such as under “emotional distress” and “information overload” in the 
face of an array of complex information required in making a decision). 
 169. THOMAS GIOVANNI, COMMUNITY ORIENTED DEFENSE: START NOW 15 
(Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law 2012), http:/brennan. 
3cdn.net/7cbfc3d811dd931019_y6m6ii3k1.pdf. 
 170. Id. 
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students meet with accused persons to collect and provide 
additional information.171  
In a similar vein, public defender offices could prepare 
educational films to be shown in jails, much like the ones shown 
to prospective jurors in court.172 Such films could describe the 
basic contours of common misdemeanor cases and some of the 
consequences of pleading guilty and going to trial. For example, 
the film could explain that the elements of loitering in Baltimore 
include “to interfere with, impede, or hinder the free passage of 
pedestrian or vehicular traffic” after receiving a warning.173 The 
film could tell defendants to be prepared to talk to their lawyer 
about whether they engaged in this conduct, and whether there 
were any witnesses. The film could also tell defendants the 
average wait time before trials are set in that jurisdiction, and 
common collateral consequences of pleading guilty to certain 
offenses, such as losing access to public housing or other 
government benefits. Films could be supplemented with written 
materials made available at booking.  
To be sure, there are many potential problems. A generic film 
can only provide a little bit of knowledge, proverbially a 
dangerous thing. Defendants may become confused, or 
subsequently reject good advice given by their lawyers. They may 
conclude they are innocent when they are not, or that they have 
legal issues when they do not. Some defendants will be left out 
because they have cases or scenarios that are not addressed by 
the film. More instrumentally, jails, prosecutors, courts, and even 
some defender offices may resist the idea of implicitly 
encouraging defendants to litigate rather than to plead. 
The theoretical objection to generalized education is that 
criminal cases are not generalized and therefore require 
individualized legal counseling. Or, to put it in doctrinal terms, 
lay people cannot be expected to make sound, informed legal 
decisions without the trained “guiding hand of counsel.”174 But 
                                                                                                     
 171. Id. at 13. 
 172. Non-profit agencies could also theoretically perform this non-
representative counseling function, but because non-lawyers would be limited in 
the advice they could give, the public defender’s office is the obvious choice. 
 173. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 19, § 25-1 (2008). 
 174. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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while this may well be true for serious cases, the misdemeanor 
system already treats defendants in bulk, processing cases by 
category with scant attention to individualized evidence. At the 
very least, we can educate defendants about the categories they 
have been put into, and about the outcomes that everyone else in 
the system regards as inevitable. This may help them have more 
meaningful conversations with their lawyers, and bring outcomes 
closer to the ideal of informed defendant choice. 
VI. Conclusion 
Garrett distrusted me from the get-go.175 Over the course of his 
criminal career he had numerous experiences with court-
appointed counsel, and he considered me—his newly-
appointed Federal Public Defender—just another government 
functionary whose job was to put him in prison. But after 
several days and long hours of conversation, he started to 
soften. Once he saw me actively pursue leads and take issues 
seriously, he came to look forward to our visits in the jail lock-
up. His tired face would crack open with a smile when he saw 
me through the plexiglass, and he’d lean in conspiratorially 
while we discussed his case. 
One day, Garrett seemed more serious than usual. After 
chatting for a few moments, he said he had something 
important to ask me.  
“I really appreciate the time you put into my case,” he said. 
“And after all this talk, I feel like, well, my case is pretty 
serious.” 
I assured him that his case was indeed serious and that he 
was looking at significant prison time. 
“So,” he said. “I want to ask your opinion. Since I got this 
serious case and all. Do you think I should get a lawyer?” 
It took me a moment to get his meaning, but then I explained 
to Garrett that I was in fact an attorney, that it was my job to 
represent him, and that I would do the very best I could. 
“Oh, I know,” he assured me. “You’re real good. No offense. I 
just meant, do you think I should get a paid lawyer?” 
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GIDEON SKEPTICISM 1087 
Fifty years ago, Clarence Earl Gideon had an intuition that 
what he needed was a lawyer: to be his champion and to ensure 
his fair treatment under the Constitution. That deep intuition 
about the central protective role of defense counsel persists, 
influencing the Supreme Court and aspiring Clarence Darrows, 
and offenders like Garrett, who accept the ideal even if they 
reject the current system of public defense.  
Nothing in this Article is intended to demean the fact that a 
good, responsive lawyer can have deep value to a defendant. The 
value is not merely the instrumental one of winning a case or 
reducing a sentence, but the dignitary value of being represented 
by a skilled advocate who can make the system work for those 
who are rarely heard. But no number of Clarence Darrows can 
make the modern sprawling criminal system fundamentally fair, 
especially in the high-volume, low-scrutiny petty offense context. 
Other actors and institutions need to bear greater responsibility 
for preserving the rights and dignity of defendants and for 
maintaining the structural fairness of the process as a whole. 
  
